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Abstract 
In South Africa, like many countries internationally, public transport contracting costs are 
continuously being scrutinised in the light of tight economic circumstances. In designing public 
transport contracts it is important that an appropriate risk-share dispensation be considered to 
ensure that the relevant entity (the authority and/or operator) carries the risk that it is best 
suited to manage. Inappropriate risk-sharing arrangements can result in additional costs being 
factored into contract bids by operators thus increasing the overall cost of public transport for 
the authority. In addition, the design of the contract e.g. net cost versus gross cost (and 
associated risk apportionment) could have a bearing on the ultimate cost of the contract. 
This paper explores the risk views of 15 contracted bus operators representing 4950 buses in 
South Africa,  based on their experiences of such contracts over several years of public 
transport contracting. The lessons learned from this research will assist contracting authorities 
in understanding how operators respond and view risks associated with various controllable 
and uncontrollable risks related to public transport contracting as it is the South African 
government’s intention to embark on the next round of public transport contracting in 2018. 
Key words 
Public transport contracting; public transport contract risks; operator risk views; risks in public 
transport contracts  
Introduction 
The procurement of public transport has changed substantially throughout the world. 
Traditionally most of the services were owned and operated by authorities but experience has 
shown that outsourcing reduces unit costs implying  that such authorities allowed costs to rise 
unnecessarily.  Many authorities now contract public transport services in order to meet new 
legislative requirements and to seek higher levels of cost and operating efficiencies.  
In Europe, for instance, Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007:L315/9 allows for the direct award of 
a public service contract (Article 5 of the Regulation)  for an internal operator (a public service 
provider owned by a public authority) but places a restriction on the estimated value (1 000 000 
€) and kilometres (300 000). A second restriction of 2 000 000 € and  600 000 km per annum 
for a direct award is possible for contracts for  small and medium sized businesses  that do not 
operate more than 23 vehicles. In all other cases, authorities are required to procure public 
transport services on a competitive basis.  Specific rules are, however, applicable to the direct 
awarding of contracts in terms of Article 5 to avoid overcompensation or a lack of compensation 
by considering quantifiable financial effects on the operator’s networks. 
In Australia, according to Hayford and Klimt (2016), reports on the franchising of bus and ferry 
services have reinforced the focus on the use of contestable franchising to improve the 
provision of public transport services. Cities such as Perth and Adelaide have been contracting 
bus services since the mid-nineties with some contested contracts in Sydney. However, the 
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Australian government continues to provide bus services in some areas of Sydney and 
Brisbane, throughout Canberra and Hobart (Hayford et al, 2016). 
In South Africa, the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996:23) states that “where 
public transport services require government funding support, for example welfare, or traffic 
management, or strategic reasons, competition will take the form of tendered contracts 
(competition on routes or networks will then be precluded)”.  
Following the White Paper’s publication a new land transport act, the National Land Transport 
Transition Act (Act 22 of 2000) (NLTTA) was promulgated wherein competitive tendering was 
affirmed, but provision was also made for negotiated public transport contracts under certain 
conditions (See section 43 (3)). The conditions for negotiated contracts were mainly focused 
on the economic empowerment of small businesses or of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination and/or to facilitate the restructuring of a parastatal (provincially-owned bus 
company) or municipal transport operator. These strict conditions towards negotiated contracts 
were later relaxed and in the subsequent National Land Transport Act of 2009 (Act 5 of 2009) 
(NLTA) to include other operators that could negotiate their existing contracts  and to enable 
them to participate in integrated public transport networks (See section 46 (1) of the NLTA). 
In 1997, in order to introduce the contracting system in the country, and to assist operators to 
“ready” themselves for the contracting system, interim contracts of between one and three 
years in duration, were concluded with all existing subsidised bus operators. The aim of the 
interim contracts was to put such services out to tender by July 2001 (Naudé, 1999, as quoted 
by Walters, 2014). As a result of this decision, a number of competitive net cost1 contracts 
were concluded with bus operators between 1997 and 2001. This process lost momentum 
after 2001 due to legal disputes between operators and government, on the higher costs of 
tenders compared to previous non-contracted services and organised labour issues with 
competitive tendering (Walters, 2014). In 2001, the Department of Transport placed a 
moratorium on further competitive tenders (Department of Transport, 2012, as quoted by 
Walters, 2014). 
Currently, the majority of bus operators operate on interim contracts concluded between 1997 
and 2001 that, in essence, formalised their historic service areas and operations in an interim 
contract (Cornelius, 2017). A limited number of net cost negotiated contracts were also 
concluded over the same period, the latter based on provisions of Section 43 (3) of the NLTTA 
(2000). Recently, with the introduction of bus rapid transit systems (BRTs) in the main urban 
areas, metropolitan authorities have concluded 12 year gross cost2 contracts with private 
sector service providers (Cornelius, 2017). It is estimated that about 6983 buses (Walters, 
2014) on the various contracting types are funded by provincial governments based on the 
Public Transport Operations Supplementary Grant stipulated in the Division of Revenue Act, 
Act 3 of 2017) (DORA). This figure excludes the gross cost contracts that are linked to the BRT 
services in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town; these services’ infrastructure and 
operational costs are funded by the respective metropolitan authorities  and the Public 
                                                            
1 In net cost contracts, the operator is responsible for the revenue and cost risks of the contract and 
retains the fare box revenue. 
2 In gross cost contracts, the operator is responsible for the cost risks in producing the service but the 
revenue risks are carried by the authority. The authority retains the fare box revenue. There are 
numerous variations on this form of contracting where, for instance, revenue risk share agreements 
exist between authorities and operators. 
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Transport Network Grant stipulated in the Division of Revenue Act (Division of Revenue Act, 
Act 3 of 2017).  
 
Cost and revenue characteristics of public transport contracts 
Public transport contracts can contain various characteristics such as operating rights, contract 
duration, escalation clauses, fare levels and annual fare increase conditions, penalties for non-
performance, fleet requirements such as fleet age, fleet condition, vehicle specifications and 
timetabling requirements. In addition, there are various types of contracts such as net cost 
contracts, gross cost contracts and hybrid gross cost contracts3. Both net and gross cost 
contracts can either be tendered or negotiated. Negotiated contracts can take on various forms 
such as operators submitting binding or non-binding bids; based on these bids the final contract 
price and service levels are negotiated with the successful bidder. Negotiation of contracts can 
also take place with an incumbent operator with no pre-qualifying steps. Negotiated contract 
pricing is often compared to benchmarked prices elsewhere in the industry. Within each of 
these contract types there are various risks that the authority and the operator have to take 
into account.  
The magnitude of financial risk for the bidding company is influenced by the contract design 
and the method of award (tendered or negotiated). In addition, the length of the contract can 
introduce significant financial risks for the operator if, for instance, the escalation clauses in 
the contract do not escalate non-controllable costs in an adequate manner.  
 
Approaches to the classification of risk in public transport contracts 
A general definition of project risk is defined by The Business Dictionary as “the exposure to a 
company that arises from taking on a particular task. A project risk can be internal to the 
business, it can involve external events or it can stem from any other circumstance that can 
hamper the project’s overall success and result in loss or embarrassment to the firm 
undertaking it. Controllable risk is “the chances of loss from various factors that can be reduced 
or avoided altogether” (Business Dictionary, 2018). 
Risk is not only inherent to projects as described in the definition above but also in any type of 
contract between two parties. According to CEFTRU(2006) as quoted by de Aragãoet al (2009) 
land passenger transport contracts have a number of risk categories and include items such 
as: 
Network design risks, contract design risks, tendering procedure risks, internal risks of 
the operators, financial risks, operational risks, market risks, interface risks with other 
operators, labour risks, regulatory change  and legislative risks, risks of government 
actions, property and residual value risks and force majeure risks. 
These risks were analysed by de Aragão et al (2009) according to the ability of the contracting 
authority and the operators to deal with them. Three categories were established; firstly, risks 
                                                            
3 Under hybrid gross cost contracts the revenue risk could be shared between the authority and 
operator based on certain conditions 
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allocated to the operators, secondly, risks allocated to the contracting authority and, thirdly, 
risks to be shared between both parties. 
In another classification, Valach (2001) as quoted by Poliak et al (2015) the risks in the 
provision of public transport services can be classified as systemic risks and non-systemic 
risks. The systemic risks include political risks (government policy changes), economic risks 
(changes in prices and spending power of the population), changes in interest rates etc. Non-
systemic risks are associated with the revenue of the organisation. Poliak et al (2015) also 
quotes Dubovická and Varcholová (2008) who categorise risks according to the factors that 
cause such risks such as technical risks, operational risks, financial risks and policy risks.  
Stanley and van de Velde (2008) classify risks into two categories – production cost risks and 
passenger revenue risks. Cost risks include operational and capital costs and revenue risks 
cause a decrease in revenue due to a reduction in the demand for the services and a structural 
change in the passenger profile.  
In considering the various risks alluded to above, contracting authorities ought to be mindful of 
the allocation of contracting risks and understand the cost and revenue implications of their 
contract designs. Van de Velde et al. (2008:8) quotes the following in this regard where 
interviews were organised by the (Dutch) Ministry of Transport aimed at identifying possibilities 
for improvements in the quality of the tendering process in public transport: “another problem 
related to authorities is that these seem to have too little knowledge on the cost consequences 
of many of their choices, obligations and wishes in the context of tendering. Furthermore, 
authorities should refrain from wanting all at once. They would be better advised to keep some 
budget aside to amend or order additional things later during the contract. For this purpose, 
flexibility should be allowed during the contract period, but it requires clear calculation. The 
TOR should provide sufficient space to allow for this to take place”. 
According to van der Velde (2008) the authority has to decide on how to allocate risk between 
contracting parties as risk can have a negative effect on the cost of contracts, especially under 
competitive tendering. According to van der Velde (2008) the higher the risk for the operator 
(see his risk classification below), the higher the risk premium the operator builds into the 
contract pricing thereby increasing the subsidy to be paid by the authority. A very high level of 
risk due to, for instance, uncertainty, may result in a higher likelihood of operator insolvency, 
when such risks materialise, and the higher the risk the lower the likelihood of the number of 
bidders for services. Van der Velde (2008) classifies risk as follows: 
Low risk: predictable for operators and/or not critical when the risks materialise and operators 
will calculate a low risk premium when pricing the service 
High risk: here there are high levels of uncertainty and/or critical risks for the operator when 
such risks materialise and operators will calculate a high risk premium 
Unbearable risk: in this case the risk is unpredictable and critical for the operator if it should 
materialise; this risk is unbearable for operators and is considered a market entry barrier. 
 
In essence, most of the contract risks mentioned above, materialise around two main risk 
areas: production (cost) and revenue risks (Stanley et al, 2008). This is also the broad focus 
of this research project. These main risk areas consist of a number of sub-risk elements that 
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are also identified and researched in this research project. Examples of these risks are 
included in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  For practical purposes not all risks can be researched in a single 
project – nor to their full conclusion. This is the subject of further research. 
 
Problem statement  
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there are areas where contract design and the 
poor apportionment of risk between the operator and the authority could result in significant 
cost “loading” by the bidding companies. In the light of the SA government’s objective to 
embark on the next round of contracting in 2018, it is important that the contracting authorities 
have a thorough understanding of the way in which operators view contract risks. This will 
minimise potential “cost loading” by operators in order to provide for cost risks that are 
potentially unmanageable by the operator but may have to be carried by the operator.  
 
Research questions and objectives 
Primary research question 
How do commuter bus operators view risks in the public transport contracting system in South 
Africa? 
Secondary research questions 
 Do operators view production cost risk differently between net and gross-cost 
contracts? 
 How do operators view the revenue risks in net and gross cost contracts? 
 How important are risk-mitigating factors in a public transport contracting system? 
 Which contract design characteristics have an influence on potential contract risk 
premiums? 
 How are the cost elements in the escalation clause viewed from a risk point of view?  
 How can risks be shared between the operator and the contracting authority? 
 What is the operator’s preference for the duration of a public transport contract and are 
there any cost benefits in longer-term contracts for the contracting authority? 
 
 
Research objectives 
Primary objective 
To determine the views of current contract operators on various contracting risks when 
contracting for public transport services.  
Secondary objectives 
 To determine whether there is a difference in risk perception between net and gross 
cost contracts 
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 To determine potential risk-mitigation measures to lower the risk of higher contract 
prices 
 To determine which contract design characteristics have a major impact on risk 
perception 
 To establish which cost elements typically contained in escalation clauses constitute 
the largest risk for operators  
 To determine the operator’s opinions about potential risk share between the authority 
and the operator, and 
 To determine the operator’s preference for contact duration and whether there are any 
financial benefits for authorities in awarding longer term contracts 
Research methodology 
To ensure that the research questions could be answered it was important that operators 
currently on contracts, and familiar with public transport contracting, participated in the survey. 
Purposive sampling was therefore used to select companies that would best be able to respond 
to the questionnaire.  This method of sampling is also known as judgemental sampling and is 
most often used when working with small samples. Purposive sampling does not purport to be 
statistically representative of the total population.  
To assist in the research, the Southern African Bus Operators Association (SABOA), a trade 
association that represents the majority of bus operators in the country, was approached to 
identify contract operators to participate in the survey. The Association identified 21 contracted 
operators as representative of subsidised and contracted bus operations in the country. Of this 
number, 16 operators are funded by the DORA that supports the traditional subsidy system in 
the country. These operators operate a combination of interim, tendered and negotiated net 
cost contracts on behalf of the respective provincial governments in South Africa. Five BRT 
operators that are currently operating 12 year gross cost contracts on behalf of metropolitan 
governments were also identified by SABOA. 
For the purpose of the research project a questionnaire was designed and divided (amongst 
other) into sections that focused on production cost and revenue risks for both gross and net 
cost contracts. No distinction was made in the questionnaire as to whether these contract types 
were negotiated with the authority or tendered competitively. This was based on pre-survey 
interviews with operators where the operators indicated that their views would not differ 
substantially regarding the risks being evaluated that is, whether these contracts were 
negotiated and/or competitively tendered. It also assisted in keeping an already long 
questionnaire to a more manageable time-frame for completion. A five-point Likert scale (Very 
high; Above average; Average; Below average and Very low) was used to assess various cost 
and revenue risk items in gross and net cost contracts.  
Respondents were also requested to rate (on a five point Likert scale:  No effect; Minor effect; 
Neutral; Moderate effect and Major effect) various risk mitigation measures that would assist 
in lowering production costs and revenue risks in gross and net-cost contracts. In addition, 
respondents were also requested to consider a number of contract design characteristics (by 
using a five-point Likert scale: Very important; Important; Fairly important; Slightly important 
and Not important) and their assessment of the characteristics’ potential impact on contract 
pricing. Questions were also included on potential risk sharing alternatives between the 
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authority and the operator and their potential impact to reduce unmanageable risks for the 
operator thus potentially resulting in lower contract pricing. 
The questionnaire was piloted among three operators to ensure completeness, relevance and 
functionality. In addition, the questionnaire was discussed with the key stakeholders at the 
National Department of Transport as the department plays a leading role in advising provincial 
governments (in this case the contracting authorities) on public transport contracting and is 
also responsible for the overall public transport policy framework. The questionnaire was 
administered electronically using Survey Monkey. Regular phone calls as well as follow-up 
reminders encouraged respondents to complete the questionnaire.   
 
Research findings 
The response to the request to participate in the survey was as follows: In total 4676 buses 
funded by the DORA (the traditional subsidy system) representing an estimated 67% of 
subsidised buses (estimated earlier in the paper to be approximately 6983 buses) on 39 
contracts were included in the survey. This represented 11 of the 16 companies funded by 
DORA that were invited to participate in the research project. In addition, four of the five BRT 
operators, representing 274 buses, responded to the survey.  The total number of respondents 
included in the survey was therefore 15 companies (representing 4950 buses) of the originally 
identified 21 companies. The overall response rate of 71% was considered adequate to arrive 
at conclusions regarding the views of operators on contract risks. 
One of the purposes of the research was to gauge the commuter bus operators’ views on cost 
risks in the contracting system. For this purpose a range of potential cost risks were identified 
– based on the literature review as well as discussions with operators. In this manner 21 cost 
risks were identified and included in the questionnaire. Respondents were requested to assess 
and rate the cost risks associated with net cost contracting based on a five-point Likert Scale 
- whether negotiated or tendered. Thereafter they were requested to do the same for gross 
cost contracting.  
Table 1 below highlights responses (shadowed areas in the table and numbers in Italics) where 
more than 5 respondents (33.3% of all respondents) indicated the importance of cost risks 
according to the five-point Likert scale. This provided a quick visual overview of the important 
cost risk areas. To simplify the analysis further and to highlight the most important cost 
elements identified by the respondents, a list of the most important cost elements is depicted 
below based on the combined results (≥ 10 respondents or 67% of total response) of cost 
elements that have a “very high” and “above average” cost impact on contracting.   
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Table 1. Cost risks associated with tendering/negotiating NCCs4 and GCCs5 
 
Source: Survey data 
Note:  
 
The numbers in each block represent the number of operators indicating the impact of the option. The table 
therefore represents a frequency count of responses together with the results of the paired samples t-test. 
Please note that the tables don’t reflect the “below average” and “very low” Likert scales as these were only 
infrequently indicated and by non-inclusion assisted in displaying the response to the statements  in a more 
meaningful way on one page. The paired samples t- test however considered all columns despite low responses in 
these two columns. 
 
In NCCs the highest cost risks identified by the respondents are: 
 Exchange rates higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital and operating costs 
 Interest rate increases higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital costs 
 Fuel price increases higher than anticipated 
 Underestimation of future operating cost increases 
 Unexpectedly high SARPBAC labour rate increases (In South Africa centralised 
bargaining for annual labour rate increases is a legislative requirement – in this case 
the South African Road Passenger Bargaining Council) 
 The cost impact of unsubsidised bus routes due to the non-expansion of 
routes/services 
 Cost impact of transport authorities’ fairness in dealing with operator issues such as 
service delivery and penalties, and 
 Cost impact of transport authorities’ decisions due to a lack of knowledge/skills of bus 
operations 
                                                            
4 NCCs refer to net cost contracts 
5 GCCs refer to gross cost contracts 
Paired Samples t‐Test
Very 
high
Above 
average Average
Very 
high
Above 
average Average (Sig. (2‐tailed) <0.05)
6 8 0 7 6 1 1.000
6 6 2 6 5 3 .334
9 5 0 10 4 0 .582
4 3 6 5 3 5 .271
7 2 4 8 2 3 .634
3 3 7 2 5 5 .670
3 4 4 4 3 3 1.000
4 4 5 6 3 3 .653
3 4 4 6 3 2 .173
5 7 2 5 6 2 .499
3 5 3 5 2 3 1.000
2 3 3 3 2 3 .806
8 6 0 7 6 1 .499
7 1 2 4 4 1 .262
1 6 5 2 5 4 1.000
5 2 4 5 4 2 .334
9 3 1 8 2 1 .265
6 3 4 6 3 2 .271
2 6 3 3 6 1 1.000
3 8 3 7 1 3 .634
7 3 3 10 0 2 .685
COST RISKS:NCC COST RISKS: GCC
Risk of increasing civilian protest action resulting in increased operating costs
Escalating congestion resulting in sub‐optimal use of the bus fleet
Cost impact of transport authorities' fairness in dealing with operator issues such as service delivery 
Residual value of bus fleet risks
Poor timetable design specifications by the authority
Underestimation of bus fleet maintenance costs
Underestimation of contract costs (own estimates and calculations)
Cost risks associated with tendering/negotiating NCCs and GCCs 
Underestimation of future  operating cost increases
Inadequate compliance to contract conditions resulting in high contract penalties
Exchange rates higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital and operating costs
Interest rate increases higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital costs
Fuel price increases higher than anticipated
Regulatory changes e.g. tax structure changes (VAT/Company tax)
Poor road conditions adversely affecting fleet maintenance costs
Cost impact of transport authorities' decisions due to a lack of knowledge /skill of bus operations
Poor managerial decisions affecting costs of operations adversely
Unexpectedly high SARPBAC labour rate increases
Taxi intimidation
Crime directly impacting the company e.g. bus component theft
Impact of B‐BBEE on company cost structure
Cost impact of unsubsidised bus routes due to the non‐expansion of routes/services 
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In GCCs the highest cost risks identified by the respondents are: 
 Exchange rates higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital and operating costs 
 Interest rate increases higher than anticipated adversely affecting capital costs 
 Fuel price increases higher than anticipated 
 Poor road conditions adversely affecting fleet maintenance costs 
 Underestimation of future operating cost increases 
 Unexpectedly high SARPBAC labour rate increases  
 The cost impact of  unsubsidised bus routes due to the non-expansion of 
routes/services, and 
 Cost impact of transport authorities’ decisions due to a lack of knowledge/skills of bus 
operations 
To determine the statistical relationship between respondent views on cost risks between 
NCCs and GCCs  a paired samples t-test were computed using SPSS software. In this test 
the mean results of each of the 21 cost risk areas were compared for net and gross-cost 
contracts by pairing each cost risk area in net-cost contracts to the same cost risk area in 
gross-cost contracts. The purpose of the test was to establish whether there was statistical 
evidence that the mean difference between paired observations was significantly different from 
zero.   The hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
H₀:  μ₀=  μ₂   (the paired population means are the same) 
H₁:  μ₁ ≠ μ₂(the paired population means are not the same) 
where: 
μ₁ is the population mean of variable 1, and 
μ₂ is the population mean of variable 2 
In Table 1 (above) the results of the paired samples t-test is presented in the last column.  
The paired samples t- test showed no statistical difference at a 95% significance level in the 
views of the respondents when considering the cost risk factors for net or gross-cost contracts.  
The respondents were then required to consider and rate the revenue risk elements on a 
five-point Likert scale for both net-cost contracts and gross-cost contracts. The same paired 
samples t-test was conducted on the data. 
Table 2 highlights revenue risks (shadowed in the table and numbers in Italics) where more 
than 5 respondents (33.3% of all respondents) indicated the importance of revenue risks based 
on the five-point Likert scale. To simplify the analysis and to highlight the most important 
revenue risk elements identified by the respondents a list of the most important revenue risk 
elements is depicted below based on the combined results (≥ 10 respondents or 67% of total 
response) of  revenue risk elements that have a “very high” and “above average” revenue 
risk impact on contracting.   
In NCCs the highest revenue risks identified by the respondents are: 
 Passenger volumes lower than expected at the commencement of service 
 Passenger volumes lower than expected during contract operations 
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 Unemployment levels higher than expected affecting passenger volumes adversely 
 Increasing traffic congestion being experienced influencing trip times and trip numbers 
 Increasing competition from the minibus taxi industry adversely affecting passenger 
volumes 
 Industrial strikes (external to the operator) adversely affecting patronage levels 
 South African economic performance worse than expected resulting in lower 
employment and therefore passenger volumes than expected 
 Taxi intimidation 
 Threat of own labour force strikes and impact on contract revenues 
 Passenger resistance to fare increases resulting in lower fare box revenue than 
expected, and 
 Inadequate cost escalation formula 
In GCCs the highest revenue risks identified by the respondents are: 
 Threat of own labour force strikes and impact on contract revenues 
 Inadequate cost escalation formula 
From the above it is evident that operators in NCCs are mainly concerned with any situation 
that could impact revenues adversely in contrast to GCCs where the revenue risks mainly 
identified under NCCs are not present as the authority carries the revenue risk. 
Table 2. Revenue risks associated with tendering/negotiating NCCs and GCCs 
 
Source: Survey data 
Note:  
The numbers in each block represent the number of operators indicating the impact of the option. The table 
therefore represents a frequency count of responses together with the results of the paired samples t-test. 
Please note that the tables do not reflect the “below average” and “very low” Likert scales as these were only 
infrequently indicated and by non-inclusion assisted in displaying the results to the statements in a more meaningful 
way on one page. The paired samples t-test however considered all columns despite low responses in these two 
columns. 
Paired Samples t‐Test
Very 
high
Above 
average Average
Very 
high
Above 
average Average (Sig. (2‐tailed) <0.05)
6 4 4 2 3 6 .053
7 4 3 2 2 7 .009
0 6 5 2 1 4 .088
5 2 5 2 7 1 .458
6 4 4 3 3 5 .041
2 6 5 2 6 3 .334
5 5 3 2 5 4 .065
5 6 2 5 3 3 .089
4 7 1 3 5 3 .212
3 9 1 3 6 3 .164
5 4 5 3 3 3 .041
6 2 4 5 2 4 .384
1 6 4 1 6 4 1.000
6 4 1 6 2 2 .082
4 6 2 7 4 2 .173
7 2 4 2 5 2 .038
9 2 3 3 4 3 .017
11 2 0 5 8 0 .009
5 2 4 3 3 4 .655
Unemployment levels higher than expected affecting passenger volumes 
Revenue risks when tendering/negotiating NCCs and GCCs
Passenger volumes lower than expected at the commencement of service
Passenger volumes lower than expected during contract operations
Passenger structure risks e.g. pensioners/scholars/worker commuter mix changes 
Poor timetable design specifications by the authority
Inadequate cost escalation formula
Escalating rail fare evasion negatively impacting on bus passenger patronage
REVENUE RISK: GCCREVENUE RISK:NCC
Underestimation of contract revenues: Subsidies received
Underestimation of private hire income
Taxi intimidation
Threat  of own labour force strikes and impact on contract revenues
Government not agreeing to requested annual passenger fare increase 
Passenger resistance to fare increases resulting in lower fare box revenues  than 
Set‐asides for SMMEs undermining potential contract revenue
Increasing traffic congestion being experienced influencing trip times and trip 
Increasing competition from the minibus taxi industry adversely affecting 
Industrial strikes (external to the operator) adversely affecting patronage levels
South African economic performance worse than expected resulting in lower 
Underestimation of contract revenues: Passenger fare income
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Findings of the paired samples t-test is reflected in the last column of Table 2. The result from 
the analysis indicates that there are significant different mean ratings (Sig. (2-tailed) <0.05) for 
a number of elements: 
 Passenger volumes lower than expected 
 Unemployment levels higher than expected affecting passenger volumes adversely 
 Underestimation of contract revenues 
 Government not agreeing to requested annual passenger fare increases percentages 
 Passenger resistance to fare increases resulting in lower fare box revenues than 
expected, and 
 Inadequate cost escalation formula 
Most of the elements listed support the characteristics of gross cost contracts i.e. that the 
revenues related to passenger support do not (at least theoretically) concern the operator as 
the revenue risk resides with the authority (no revenue risk sharing being assumed). In this 
case the operator is remunerated on kilometres operated irrespective of passenger loads being 
affected by lower passenger volumes than expected, unemployment, underestimation of 
contract revenues (contrary to the critical role played by passenger volumes in net-cost 
contracts), passenger fare increases (it’s an authority issue in gross-cost contracts) or 
passenger resistance to fare increases. 
 
Potential risk mitigating measures 
In both contract types the authority has the ability to introduce risk mitigating measures to 
lower the risk for the operator. Respondents were requested to evaluate a list of risk mitigation 
measurements.  Results are shown in table 3. 
Table 3. Risk mitigation measures and their impact on risk assessment of NCCs and 
GCCs 
 
Source: Survey data 
Note:  
The numbers in each block represent the number of operators indicating the impact of the option. The table 
therefore represents a frequency count of responses together with the results of the paired samples t-test. 
Please note that the tables don’t reflect the “no affect” and “minor affect” Likert scales as these were only 
infrequently indicated and by non-inclusion assisted in displaying the results to the statements in a more meaningful 
way on one page. The paired samples t-test however considered all columns despite low responses in these two 
columns. 
Paired Samples t‐Test
Neutral Moderate affect
Major 
affect Neutral
Moderate 
affect
Major 
affect (Sig. (2‐tailed) <0.05)
2 3 9 4 6 4 .150
3 4 8 5 3 4 .013
2 5 8 3 4 6 .089
3 5 7 4 4 6 .217
3 6 6 6 4 4 .068
2 1 12 2 2 10 .217
2 2 11 2 6 7 .041
2 3 10 1 5 9 1.000
Escalation formula to be accurate (cost element weightings) and fair (correct cost indices applied)
Adjustment of bus running costs AFTER contract commencement
RISK MITIGATION:GCC
Risk mitigation measures and their impact on risk assessment in NCCs and GCCs
Flexibility in contract design specifications AFTER contract commencement
Passenger base load adjustments AFTER contract commencement
Adjustments to the routes AFTER contract commencement
Adjustments to bus frequencies and headways AFTER contract commencement
Adjustments to the bus fleet mix e.g. bus sizes AFTER contract commencement
Authority willingness to review contract cost escalation formula DURING the contract  operational period
RISK MITIGATION:NCC
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When reviewing the frequency count for NCCs it is evident that the majority of respondents 
viewed all listed risk mitigation measures as having a major/moderate effect on the risk 
assessment of NCCs. This is to be expected as the operator in these instances carry both cost 
and revenue risk in rendering the service.  Of particular importance (≥ 10/15 respondents 
indicating the area of importance) are risks related to: 
 the authority willingness to review contract escalation formula during the contract 
operational period, 
 the escalation formula should be accurate (cost element weightings) and fair (correct 
cost indices applied),and 
 that bus running costs should be adjusted after contract commencement. 
In terms of GCCs one area of importance stood out (≥ 10/15 respondents indicating the area 
of importance): 
 the authority should be willing to review the contract escalation formula during the 
contract operational period. 
Significantly different mean ratings (Sig. (2-tailed)<0.05) were recorded for passenger base 
load adjustments after contract commencement and for the escalation formula to be accurate 
(cost element weightings) and fair (correct cost indices applied). In the first instance, the 
difference can be explained by the nature of NCCs where the passenger base load and 
volumes are critical for the operator as the revenue risks reside with the operator. In the second 
case the escalation formula appears to be more critical for NCCs compared to GCCs probably 
due to the dual risks that operators have to contend with in NCCs – revenue and cost risks. 
 
Summary of this section of the paper 
It is evident that respondents do not view cost risks differently when considering the tendering 
or negotiating of NCCs or GCCs. In the paired samples t-test there were no significant different 
mean ratings (Sig. (2-tailed) < 0.05) between these two contract types. This finding broadly 
supports the expectation that no difference ought to exist as operators carry all the cost risks 
in both NCCs and GCCs. 
Statistically significant different mean ratings (Sig. (2-tailed) < 0.05) were, however, found 
when comparing revenue risks that respondents evaluated related to NCCs and GCCs. These 
differences related to the nature of NCCs and GCCs where in the latter case the authority 
carries the revenue risk. 
 
 
 
Contract design characteristics  
A number of options exist for the contracting authority when designing public transport 
contracts. These characteristics could have an impact on contract pricing, viewed from the 
operator’s point of view, and should therefore be carefully considered by the authority. 
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Table 4 displays the views of respondents about contract design characteristics and the 
potential impact on contract pricing. A five-point Likert scale was used to capture the 
respondent’s views (Very important (1); Important (2); Fairly Important (3); Slightly important 
(4) and Not important (5)). 
Table 4. Contract design characteristics and potential impact on contract pricing 
 
Source: Survey data 
Note: 
The Likert scale numbering affects the median, mean and standard deviation calculations. Lower mean ratings 
indicate higher levels of importance (1=very important).The numbers in each block represent the number of 
operators indicating the impact of the option. The table therefore represents a frequency count of responses. 
Please note that the table does not reflect the “slightly important” and “not important” Likert scales as these were 
only infrequently indicated and by non-inclusion assisted in displaying the results of the statements in a more 
meaningful way on one page. The median, mean and standard deviation calculations however do consider the two 
omitted scales. 
 
From the table it is evident that respondents are of the opinion that they should be consulted 
or allowed to give some input into contract designs and that they view their inputs as important 
or very important in overall contract pricing. More than half of the 15 respondents (≥ 8 
respondents out of 15) indicated the following: 
 Authority and the operator negotiate routes, frequencies and headways 
 Operator is allowed to suggest adjustments in authority-specified designs after contract 
award 
 Operator is allowed to specify routes, frequencies and headways for the consideration 
of the authority 
 Authority specifies core service to be operated with operator allowed to specify non-
core routes, frequencies and headways, and 
 Operator is allowed the option to group various contracts into one or more major 
contracts to benefit from operational scale and scope economies 
From the above, the highest mean ratings were recorded for: 
 Authority and the operator negotiates routes, frequencies and headways, and 
 Operator is allowed the option to group various contracts into one or more major 
contracts to benefit from operational scale and scope economies 
 
The importance of escalation indexes  
It has been shown earlier that respondents view the contract escalation clause as very 
important. In considering cost risk elements it became clear that one of the risk mitigation 
factors is that the escalation formula should be accurate (cost element weightings) and fair 
Very important 
(1) Important (2)
Fairly 
important (3) Median Mean
Standard 
Deviation
7 5 1 2.00 1.87 1.02
5 7 3 2.00 1.87 0.72
11 2 2 1.00 1.40 0.72
9 4 2 1.00 1.53 0.72
9 4 2 1.00 1.53 0.72
3 8 3 2.00 2.20 0.98
10 4 0 1.00 1.47 0.81
Operator is allowed to specify routes, frequencies and headways for the consideration of the authority 
Authority specifies core service to be operated with operator allowed to specify non-core routes, frequencies and headways
Operator is allowed the option to group various contracts into one or more major contracts to benefit from  operational scale and scope economies
Contract design characteristics
Authority needs to specify all routes, frequencies and headways for operator to operate - no deviation allowed
Operator suggests routes, frequencies and headways based on available funding
Authority and the operator negotiates  routes, frequencies and headways
Operator is allowed to suggest adjustments in authority-specified designs after contract award
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(correct cost indices applied) and that the authority ought to be willing to review the contract 
cost escalation formula during the contract period. This is especially important over relatively 
long contract periods of between 7 and 12 years as bus company cost structures (and therefore 
cost element weightings) could change significantly based on major cost factors such as fuel, 
labour and maintenance. Under the revenue risks section of the research inadequate cost 
escalation formulae also rated high. 
In order to further explore this area respondents were requested to rate a number of cost 
elements and their potential impact on contract cost risk premiums. A five-point Likert scale 
was used: No risk (1); Minor risk (2); Neutral risk (3), Moderate risk (4) and Major risk (5). The 
results are shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Rating the cost elements of an escalation clause and their potential impact on 
contract risk premiums 
 
Source: Survey data 
Note: 
The Likert scale numbering affects the median, mean and standard deviation calculations. Higher mean ratings 
indicate higher levels of importance.  
The numbers in each block represent the number of operators indicating the impact of the option. The table 
therefore represents an actual frequency count of responses. 
Please note that the tables do not reflect the “no risk” and “minor risk” Likert scales as these were not rated at all 
by respondents.  By non-inclusion assisted in displaying the results of the statements in a more meaningful way on 
one page. The median, mean and standard deviation calculations however do consider the two omitted scales. 
 
From the table it  is evident that fuel (mean=5.0), labour (mean= 4.87) and bus maintenance 
costs (mean= 4.73) are considered major risk factors that could impact contract pricing. These 
three cost elements collectively constitute approximately 75%-80% of the cost structure of 
commuter bus companies in South Africa (Cornelius, 2017). These risks are especially 
concerning to the operator if their weighting as part of the total formula is considered to be 
unfair, inaccurate or official indexes used to calculate these cost elements are not considered 
appropriate for the industry. The latter conclusion is also one of the main conclusions in the 
risk mitigation factors that authorities can consider in lowering contract risk (see the section on 
risk mitigation). 
 
Risk sharing in contracts 
The discussion thus far considered the potential impact of costs, revenues, risk mitigation 
measures, cost elements of the escalation indexes and their impact on how respondents 
Neutral risk (3) Moderate risk (4) Major risk (5) Median Mean
Standard 
deviation
0 0 15 5.00 5.00 0.00
0 2 13 5.00 4.87 0.34
0 8 7 4.00 4.47 0.50
2 9 4 4.00 4.13 0.62
2 6 7 4.00 4.33 0.70
2 0 13 5.00 4.73 0.68
2 10 3 4.00 4.07 0.57
4 10 1 4.00 3.80 0.54
Exchange rate fluctuations
 Administered prices e.g. rates and taxes of the local 
Cost elements
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (currently part of the various 
Labour costs
Insurance costs
Interest rate fluctuations
Fuel costs
Bus maintenance costs 
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viewed risks and potentially contract cost risk premiums and contract duration and its potential 
impact on contract pricing. 
It is possible, apart from the measures to mitigate risk, as discussed earlier, to also share risk 
between the authority and the operator. This is especially the case in gross-cost contracts 
where revenue risks are often shared based on a formula that the parties agree to – if revenue 
falls below a certain threshold both the operator and the authority share in the costs, 
conversely, if revenue exceeds certain thresholds the additional revenue generated is shared 
between the authority and the operator. This overcomes some of the criticisms often lodged 
against gross-cost contracts that there is no incentive for the operator to grow or maintain its 
passenger base thus exposing the authority to unforeseen cost risks. 
In the following table 6 respondents were requested to indicate their preference for potential 
cost risk share between the operator and the authority. 
Table 6: Potential cost risk share between the operator and the authority 
 
Source: Survey data 
Observations from table 6 are interesting. It is the view of the respondents that the operator 
should not carry the labour, fuel and exchange rate fluctuations risks. None of the respondents 
indicated that the operator should carry these risks. The general view is that these risks should 
be carried by the authority. The highest mean scores were also achieved for these three 
elements. In addition to these three elements interest rate fluctuations also rated high at a 
mean score of 2.33 for a risk share between the authority and the operator. 
As expected, the responses indicated that the authority should carry the passenger revenue 
and volume risks in gross cost contracts and the operator in net-cost contracts. In the latter 
case 33.3% of respondents were of the view that the revenue risks should also be shared 
between the authority and the operator. Significant views on risk share between the operator 
and the authority (more than 33.3% of respondents) include labour cost increases, exchange 
rate fluctuations, interest rate fluctuations, bus maintenance costs and passenger revenue 
risks in net-cost contracts. 
Duration of contracts 
The duration of a contract could influence overall contracting costs as the capital cost of 
equipment and buses (operators are responsible to provide their own bus fleets) are written 
off over a longer period thus reducing the capital cost portion of the overall contract price. In 
South Africa it is proposed that contracts should be seven years in duration and if an operator 
Operator 
should carry 
the risk 
element
Authority 
should carry 
the risk 
element
Risk should be 
shared 
between the 
authority and 
operator
Median Mean Standard deviation
0 10 5 2.00 2.33 0.47
0 11 4 2.00 2.27 0.44
0 9 6 2.00 2.40 0.49
2 6 7 2.00 2.33 0.70
5 5 5 2.00 2.00 0.82
7 5 3 2.00 1.73 0.77
8 4 3 1.00 1.67 0.79
12 2 1 1.00 1.27 0.57
7 3 5 2.00 1.87 0.88
2 10 3 2.00 2.07 0.57
9 3 3 1.00 1.60 0.80
3 9 3 2.00 2.00 0.63
Passenger revenue risks (gross cost contracts)
Passenger volume risks (net cost contracts)
Passenger volume risks (gross cost contracts)
Interest rate fluctuations
Bus maintenance costs
Spares and equipment costs
Administered prices e.g. rates and taxes of the local authority
Insurance costs
Passenger revenue risks (net cost contracts)
Cost risk sharing elements
Labour cost increases
Fuel cost increases/decreases
Exchange rate fluctuations
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meets certain service level criteria (to be determined in the 6th year of operation), can be 
extended by an additional five years to 12 years. Currently all the BRT contracts are 12 years 
in duration – negotiated as 12-year contracts from the outset. Respondents were requested to 
indicate their preference for the duration of public transport contracts and, secondly, to indicate 
whether the authority would get some cost advantage when seven-year contracts were 
compared to 12 year contracts. Results for the contract preference are shown in table 7 and 
for the cost advantage of longer-term contracts in table 8. 
 
Table 7: Preference for the ideal contract duration in years 
 
Source: Survey data 
From table 7 it is evident that 13 of the 15 respondents or 87% preferred 12-year contracts. 
With the exception of one respondent, none of the other respondents preferred contracts with 
less than a seven-year duration.  
Table 8 depicts the perceived cost advantage to the authority of seven- and 12 year contracts 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Cost advantage of 7 versus 12 year contracts 
 
Source: Survey data 
 
First choice Second choice Third choice Response Count
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 2 2
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0
1 4 9 14
0 9 0 9
13 0 0 13
1
 Five years
Ten years
Years
Seven years
Twelve years
Four years
Nine years
Six years
Eleven years
Three years
Eight years
Other (please specify)
No cost 
advantage
Minor cost 
advantage Neutral
Moderate cost 
advantage
Major cost 
advantage Median Mean
Standard 
deviation
3 1 5 6 0 3.00 2.93 1.12
1 0 0 3 11 5.00 4.53 1.02
Contract duration
Seven year contract
Twelve year contract
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The majority of respondents were of the view that 12 year contracts would provide a major 
cost advantage to the authority when compared to the neutral to moderate cost advantage of 
seven year contracts. This is probably due to the fact that operators have to provide their own 
bus fleets and depots when tendering for contracts. Discussions with the operators about 
longer term contracts revealed that longer term contracts, such as 12 years, would only be 
feasible for operators if the escalation formula in the contracts would escalate the major cost 
items listed in table 5 in an acceptable manner, otherwise the cost risks could would be 
unmanageable. 
 
Discussion of the results and conclusions 
The main objective of this research was to gauge the opinions of contracted bus operators on 
the various types of risks inherent in public transport contracting that could result in operators 
building  a cost risk premium into public transport contracts. Various potential risk elements 
were therefore identified and grouped under mainly production cost risks and revenue risks for 
both net and gross-cost contracts. Respondents were requested to rate the risks and their 
impact on contract pricing. It was established that the respondents viewed (in essence) the 
production cost risks as being the same between NCCs and GCCs, as was expected, as 
in both types of contracts the production cost risks reside with the operator. Contrary to this 
revenue risks recorded statistically significant different mean ratings, based mainly on 
the different revenue risk characteristics of NCCs and GCCs. It is important that authorities 
pay attention to these revenue risk views that pertain to NCCs as any uncertainty about 
aspects such as passenger volumes that are lower than expected, an underestimation of 
contract revenues, difficulty in getting government to agree to annual passenger fare increases 
and inadequate escalation formulae (also for GCCs) could result in risk premiums being built 
into NCCs. 
Some of the risk elements identified in tables 1 and 2 could, however, be mitigated should the 
authority be willing to consider risk mitigation measures in especially NCCs such as flexible 
contract designs and passenger base load adjustments after contract commencement, 
adjustment to routes after contract commencement, the willingness to review contact 
escalation formulae during the contract period and to ensure that escalation formulae are 
accurate and fair.  
It has also been found that operators would like to be involved, in one way or another, in the 
design characteristics of public transport contracts and that this involvement could have 
potential positive impacts on contract pricing. More than half of respondents highlighted areas 
such as that the authority and the operator negotiate routes, frequencies and headways, that 
the operator be allowed to suggest amendments to authority-specified designs after contract 
commencement, that the operator be allowed to specify routes, frequencies and headways for 
the consideration of the authority and that the operator be allowed the option to group various 
contracts into one or more larger contracts to benefit from operational scale and scope 
economies, thus reducing the overall contract cost. 
Cost formula characteristics are important. It was found that fuel, labour and bus maintenance 
costs are considered major risk factors that could affect contract risk premiums. It is important 
that the weighting of these elements in the cost escalation formula is accurate and fair in terms 
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of the indexes used to calculate movements. Over especially longer-term contracts, these 
elements could become unmanageable risks for operators if not dealt with in a fair and just 
manner.  
Risk can, however, also be shared between contracting parties. Most operators were however 
of the view that cost elements, such as labour costs, fuel costs and the cost impact of exchange 
rate fluctuations (South Africa as a developing country has a very volatile currency that can 
fluctuate substantially thus impacting capital costs, spares and equipment that are mostly 
imported), should be carried by the authority.  
Lastly, the duration of a contract and the potential benefit on contract pricing was discussed. 
It was shown that the majority of operators preferred 12-year contracts and believed that such 
contracts would result in a major cost advantage for the authority. 
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